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Abstract
Many online content providers tend to charge their services since they are confronted with difficulties
to attain revenue from the online advertising. This paper shows why they charge their services as the
online market becomes grow and explore the strategies when the conventional offline contents firms
enter the online contents market. And we also discuss some implications related to pricing strategies
in online contents market.
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1. Introduction
The Internet provides a new distribution channel of content for conventional offline media
firms such as newspaper, magazine and encyclopedia publishers and broadcasting companies
with very low marginal production and distribution cost of online content. There have been
various revenue models in online contents markets when comparing with traditional offline
channel such as advertising model, subscription model, affiliation fee model, etc. In the
earlier of the Internet era, most of contents firms provided their services free in order to boost
offline revenue or they depend on advertising revenue sources in lieu of attaining revenue
from their services or contents. However, as they are confronted with many difficulties to
attain revenue from only the online advertising model, many online content providers began
to charge their services.
The Wall Street Journal Online is one of the few successful online advertising
subscription mixed model services in newspaper industry. The Wall Street Journal online has
launched in 1996 as fee-based service since the beginning of online service. Now it has over
0.6milion subscribers online. In 2001, the revenues of the Wall Street Journal online declined
10 percent in part due to decline in advertising revenue. The Wall Street Journal online raised
its yearly fee from $59 to $79 for non-print subscribers and from $29 to $39 for print
subscribers. It continuously increases the revenue proportion of subscription fee when
comparing with advertising revenue. Financial Times(FT.com) began to charge for its online
service in may 2002. It charged $75 yearly fee for service of search of news, survey and
famous column. The New York Times originally planed to charge fee for subscription but
online subscribers increased so slowly that changed its strategy from fee based to free pricing
in 1999. But it charges for the database search of old archives. Britannica Online has been
provided from 1994. First, it started its service with fee based but it changed its strategy from
fee based to free pricing sponsored with advertising revenue. The free pricing strategy of
online service turned out to be failure cause it cannibalized its own offline market. Britannica
decided to recharge its online service for recovering its offline sales reduction.
Digital Chosun (Chosun.com), the largest newspaper company in Korea, began to
charge for its PDF file in news DB in November 2001. It charged $0.24 per page of PDF
version of original newspaper for news from 1945 to 1999 and free usage for news after 2000.
The charged online service records over expected usage and therefore it is understood
success of charged online service. SBSi (sbs.co.kr), the broadcasting company in Korea,
began to charge its online contents in 2001. It charged $1.6 per 24 hours for usage of its all
contents or $0.4 per volume such as VOD service of old TV program though there was
opposition of users for charging online service. Also other broadcasting companies such as
KBS and MBC have plan to charge therir online VOD services.
A tacit belief had prevailed that contents provided in the Internet was free and online
users have resisted paying for the online content in early era of the Internet. However, tides
are changing with depression and harsh competition in the advertising market. Recently, the
relative importance of the subscription model or advertising subscription mixed model is
raised and the pricing scheme of online contents has become important issue.
As mentioned above, because online contents are produced and distributed with
almost zero cost, cost based pricing will always result in free pricing, So this pricing scheme
is not very useful in this environment. Instead, value based pricing scheme is to be more
effective (Varian, 1995, 1997). For the characteristic of Internet and availability of micro
payment technology in the Internet, unbundling of content that was previously bundled in
offline market can be possible. Also the Internet makes it possible and profitable to bundle
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large scale of information that was not available in the offline with low marginal costs
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999b). Bundling and unbundling of online content combining with
online pricing strategies have become major controversial research issues. Bundling is
preffered in its less dependence of variation in preference of consumers (Bakos and
Brynjolfsson, 1999b; Schmalensee, 1982). Bundling is favored in the arguments but still
unbundling and unit pricing cannot be negligible. Some suggested that mixed strategy of
bundling and unbundling can be profitable to the providers (Chung and Sirbu 1997;
Brynjolfsson 1999b). But most of these studies were focused on monopolistic online content
provider. Fishburn and Odlyzko showed that there exist competitive online pricing equilibria
between subscription based and per-use basis charging firms (1999). But still a point of
sameness is that these studies only focused on online market so cannot explain the dynamic
interaction between online and offline content market. Quite many of the online content
providers are originated with offline content providers who are providing online and offline
content goods at the same time. Like as there exist cannibalization effect on existing offline
retailing market of e-retailing, the effect of cannibalization of own online content on existing
offline market cannot be negligible (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). For example, the sales of
paper based Britannica of the 1996 has fallen to 17% of the sales of the 1990 but on the other
hand, the sales of electronic version have been increased (Auchter, 1999).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze interactive pricing strategies of online and
offline when the conventional offline media firm enters the online content market and
compete with existing offline competitor. The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2
presents the model that the conventional offline media firm enters the online contents market.
Section 3 explores equilibrium prices and draws some implications. Section 4 concludes and
discusses future research works.

2. The Model
Our model is derived from horizontal differentiation model of Hotelling(1929) for the tastes
vary in the population. We assume that duopoly exist in the market. Two firms produce
horizontally differentiated goods and one of the firms has the ability to enter the online
content market. We consider a linear city of length 1 where two offline stores competes. One
store, denoted by A, is located at 0 and another offline store, denoted by B, is located at the
end of the city. We also assume that firm A gets ready to provide online contents. Unit
production costs of both offline stores are assumed to be equal to C . Without loss of
generality, the unit cost in the online store is assumed to be zero. Consumers are distributed
uniformly along the city according to their preferences. Let θ ∈ [0,1] be the distance from store
A. The distance, θ , represents not only physical distance but also different preference to store
A such as the opportunity cost of time or the implicit cost of inconvenience.
Each consumer buys one or zero unit of goods. Consumers who are located at 0 or 1 are
assumed to value offline goods at V . And the consumer at 0 has lower valuation of the online
contents, δ V where δ ∈ (0,1) . When the consumer at θ buys contents from firm A, he has to
pay tθ . If he buys it from firm B, he has to pay t (1 − θ ) where t is a sensitivity measure of
preference cost per unit of length. A positive t means that a consumer who has higher
valuation for the contents of firm B has to pay higher opportunity costs for buying from firm
A. We also assume that when an online customer buys contents from online sites, he has to
pay some lump-sum customer cost, a , such as costs of the internet access, time for searching
contents and other costs related to security risk. Also, this customer cost can include waiting
time cost until the online contents are loading. Thus, the utility of a consumer located at θ is
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(1 − θ )V − PA − tθ
 δ (1 − θ )V − P − a − tθ

a
U =
 θV − PB − t (1 − θ )
0
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if he buys offline contents from firm A
if he buys online contents from firm A
if he buys online contents from firm B
if he buys nothing

where PA and PB are the prices charged by the offline and online stores and Pa is the price of
the online contents of the firm A. A customer buys the offline contents from A if
(1 − θ )V − PA − tθ ≥ δ (1 − θ )V − Pa − a − tθ .
Thus, the marginal consumer who is indifferent between online contents and offline contents
of firm A is located at
(1 − δ )V + Pa + a − PA
.
θ1 =
(1 − δ )V
Likewise, the consumer who is indifferent between online contents of A and offline contents
of B is located at
δV + PB − ( Pa + a) + t
.
θ2 =
(1 + δ )V + 2t
Figure 1 depicts a typical case of the choice of consumers.
Net Utility

V − PB

V − PA

δV − Pa − a

0
θ1
θ2
1
Figure 1. Typical choice of subscribers

The equilibrium is characterized by the following:
(i ) PA − (1 − δ )V ≤ Pa + a
(ii ) δ V − Pa − a ≥ 0

(1)

(iii ) 0 < θ 1 < θ 2 < 1

The first condition implies that buying offline contents from A does not dominate buying
online contents from A. In other words, customers located at θ < θ1 prefer the offline
contents of firm A while consumers at θ1 < θ < θ 2 prefer the online contents of firm A. The
second condition means that customers can earn nonnegative utility when buying from the
online sites. So the online store can attract consumers. The third condition implies that there
are three kinds of consumers in the city, thus consumers with θ > θ 2 prefer firm B to the
online site of firm A and consumers with θ1 < θ < θ 2 subscribe to the online contents. In this
type of equilibrium, the demand functions are given by
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DA (PA , Pa , PB ) = θ1

Da (PA , Pa , PB ) = θ 2 − θ1
DB (PA , Pa , PB ) = 1 − θ 2

3. Equilibrium and Implications
We now examine equilibrium prices and then draw some implications. We analyze the two
situations, which are classified into one case where two media firms compete in the
conventional offline markets and the other case where the conventional offline media firm
enters the online contents market. We follow basic Hotelling’s differentiated model (Tirole,
1989).

3.1 Case 1: Duopoly Competition in the Offline Market
As a benchmark, we consider the case where the offline firms do not enter the online markets.
In this case, the consumer who is indifferent to between A and B is located at
V + t + (P B − P A ) . Therefore, profits of each firm are given by
θ =
2 (V + t )
 V + t + ( PB − PA ) 

− C )
2 (V + t )



V + t + ( PB − PA ) 
.
Π B ( PB ; PA ) = (PB − C ) 1 −
2 (V + t )


Π

A

(PA ; PB ) = (PA

Optimal prices that maximize the above functions are
*

*

PA = PB = V + t .

From these we have the profits of each firm and we find the equilibrium prices and profits
increase as t increases, which can represent a more differentiated market.

3.2 Case 2: Competition between Hybrid and Offline firms
Now consider the case where the hybrid firm A enters the online contents market. Then, the
profit functions are as follows:
 δV + PB − (Pa + a) + t (1 − δ )V + (Pa + a) − PA 
 (1 − δ )V + (Pa + a) − PA 

 + (Pa − C )
−
Π A (PA , Pa ; PB ) = (PA − C )
−
δ
(
1
)
(1 + δ )V + 2t
(1 − δ )V
V




 δV + PB − (Pa + a) + t 
.
Π B (PB ; PA , Pa ) = (PB − C )1 −
(1 + δ )V + 2t



From the first-order conditions we draw the reaction functions given by
P A = Pa +

(1 − δ )V

+ a

2
Pa + t + V + a
PB =
2
(2 a + (1 − δ )V
(
1 − δ )V
PB −
Pa =
4 (V + t )
4

)

Chung,Hong,Joo,Ji-Ho Kim,Fun-Jin Kim,Min-Young Kim

A Strategic Analysis of Internet Contents Market in EC

From the reaction functions we have following optimal prices:
PA

*

Pa

*

PB

*

( 5 + δ )V + a + 6 t
6
(1 + 2 δ ) V + 3 t − a
=
3
( 2 + δ )V + 3 t + a
=
3
=

3.3 Implications
We now find the condition for firm A’s entry into the online contents market and analyze the
reason that online contents providers have to change for their contents nowadays. First, we
draw some conditions for entry. Then the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1.
( i ) Π A 2 − Π A1

*
*
*
≥
≥
∂ Pa
∂ PA 2
∂ PB 2
0 if and only if a aˆ and
≥ 0,
≥ 0 and
≤0
≤
≤
∂a
∂a
∂a

∂ aˆ
≤0
∂t
≥
* ≥
*
* ≤
*
( iii )PA 2
PA1 and PA 2
PB 2 if and only if a a~ = (1 − δ )V
≤
≥
≤

( ii )

( iv )

(

*

∂ PA 2 − PB 2
∂a

*

) ≤ 0 and ∂ (P

A2

*

− PB 2

∂δ

*

) ≤ 0.

Proof. (i) We obtain a ≥ aˆ (V , δ , t ) satisfying Π A 2 − Π A1 >0.

∂PA*2 1
= >0
∂a
6

,

∂PB*2 1
= >0
∂a
3

and

∂aˆ
≤ 0 from calculation. (iii) We can easily show the condition
∂t
*
*
by simple calculation. (iv) These are proved by showing ∂ (PA2 − PB 2 ) = − 1 < 0 and
∂Pa*
1
= − < 0.
∂a
3

(

*

*

)

(ii) Also we find

∂ PA2 − PB 2
1
= − < 0.
∂δ
6

∂a

6



The first part of the proposition says that if customer costs are higher, firm A has more entry
incentives and as customer costs are lower, online prices increase, while the offline prices
decrease. This is because the online market becomes efficient (or customer cost, a, becomes
lower), there occurs fierce competition in the offline markets with lower prices in the offline
market, which strategically works to move consumers to the online store and cannibalizes the
profit of its own offline part by lowering offline prices. 1 When the online market is very
efficient ( a ≤ aˆ ), the offline store has no incentive to enter the online market. This is because
the increasing profit of the online cannot overcome the loss in the profit own offline part.
This implies that many online content providers try to increase their prices and some online
contents providers begin to charge for their services as the online market becomes efficient.2

1

2

∂D
∂D
∂DA
> 0, B > 0, e < 0.
∂a
∂a
∂a
In the Appendix, we analyzed the case where the online contents provider doesn’t charge for its own contents.
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For example, following to the Wall Street Journal, recently Financial Times (FT.com)
announced that it will partially charge for its online contents.
The second part of the proposition is closely related to the first part. It says that as the
unit preference cost is higher, the threshold of entry becomes larger. This is because there are
more possibilities to enjoy profit since we can interpret that high t means less competition
between the offline firms or higher differentiated products (or services) or variety of
customers’ preferences. In the earlier era of online contents services, a relatively higher t,
some online media sites such as pornography, VOD movie broadcasting, financial stock
information, began to charge for their services.
The third part of the proposition says that as the online market becomes efficient (or
lower customer costs), the offline price of the hybrid firm is lower than the offline price
before entry, while the offline price of the hybrid firm is higher than the offline price of rival
firm B. This is because as customer cost decreases, the downward pressure works more
strongly on the price of rival firm B. This is closely in line with the last part of the
proposition, which says that as the value of online service increases, the price of the rival
firm B decreases with a steeper slope than the offline price of the hybrid firm A.

4. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have analyzed pricing strategies when the conventional offline media
firms enter the online contents market, and the explained the trend of online media firms
starting to charge for their contents. The main results are that as the online market becomes
efficient (or customer costs are lower), the conventional offline media firm has less entry
incentives and the online price becomes higher. This explains the trends that many online
contents providers try to increase their prices and some online contents providers begin to
charge for their services. For future study we expect to do research on strategic interactions
when the other rival offline firm acts on reciprocal entry into the online market. And we need
to expand to a two stage model, considering quality and price as a decision variables of the
offline firm when it enters the online market.
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Appendix: Case for Free Online Contents
First, we examine whether there is possibility that firm A provides online contents without
charge. As a convention, online contents such as news and other information on homepages
had been free. Also we analyze the sensitivity of the entry condition according to external
variable, t and δ . Generally we assume V ≥ t . If firm A does not charge for online contents,
equilibrium prices are given by
*

(1 − δ ) V + a
2
(1 − δ ) V + 2 a
=
3

PA =
PB

*

Applying assumptions in equation (5.1) to above equilibrium prices, we have the following
conditions:
V ≥

a

δ

and

V ≥

a + 3t
2+δ

.

We assume that these conditions also hold. Then we have the following results:
Proposition A.1.

(i) If customer cost exceeds at least aˆ ≡

(

(

)

)

1
(−5 + 2δ )V − 3t + 2 δ 2 − 2δ + 10 V 2 + 18tV + 9t 2 ,
3

firm A has incentive to provide online contents without charge.
(ii) Thresholds level of customer costs, â , increases in t and δ .
Proof. (i) Let Π A1 be the profit of firm A in Case 1 and Π A 2

Pa = 0

be that of firm A under free

charge for online contents in Case 2. Then, the difference between the latter and the former is
given by
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((1 − δ )V + a )2 − V + t .

Pa = 0 − Π A1 =

4(1 − δ )V

2

≥ Π A1 if

Pa = 0

(

(δ

1
( − 5 + 2 δ )V − 3 t + 2
3

2

)

− 2 δ + 10 V

2

+ 18 tV + 9 t 2

).

(ii) Using V ≥ t , we can find that
∂aˆ (V , δ , t )
∂δ

V =t

=

2V
3


1 −



 2V 
≥
1 −
δ 2 − 2δ + 10 V 2 + 18tV + 9t 2  3 
1−δ

(

)

> 0 for δ ∈ (0,1) and ∂aˆ (V , δ , t )
∂t

≥

(δ

6(V + t )
2

)

− 2δ + 10 V

2

−1 =

(

V =t

6 1+ t

=

)

(δ

(

)

(

6(V + t )
2

)

− 2δ + 10 V 2 + 18tV + 9t 2

> 0 for
V
−1
δ − 2δ + 10
2



δ 2 − 2δ + 37 t 2 
1− δ

δ ∈ (0,1) . 

−1

)

